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Recent water sector reforms, increased scarcity and vulnerability of existing water 
resources, combined with declining public funding available for large-scale infrastructure 
investment in the sector have led to an increased awareness by the Government of 
Vietnam for the need to analyze water resource allocation and use in an integrated 
fashion, at the basin scale, and from an economic efficiency perspective.  This paper 
presents the development, application, and results from an integrated economic-
hydrologic river basin model for the Dong Nai River Basin in southern Vietnam that 
attempts to address these issues.  The model framework takes into account the sectoral 
structure of water users (agriculture, industry, hydropower, households, and the 
environment), the location of water-using regions, and the institutions for water allocation 
in the basin.  Water benefit functions are developed for the major water uses subject to 
physical, system control, and policy constraints.  Based on this modeling framework, 
policies that can affect water allocation and use at the basin level, including both basin-
specific and general macroeconomic policies, are analyzed.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION – BACKGROUND ON THE DONG NAI RIVER BASIN 
 
The Dong Nai River Basin (DNRB) is the largest national river basin and the economic 
center of the country in southern Vietnam.  The basin includes lowland areas that are subject to 
annual flooding in the wet season and salinity intrusion in the dry season as well as mountainous 
highland areas of up to 1,600 m.  In addition, for administrative and planning purposes, a series of 
several smaller coastal basins
3 are combined with the Dong Nai basin adding to a total surface 
area of 48,471 km
2 within Vietnam, or about 15 percent of the country’s land surface area (see 
also Figure 1).  
                                                 
1 International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. 
2 Sub-Institute for Water Resources Planning, HCMC, Vietnam. 
3 In the following, references to the Dong Nai basin include the surrounding coastal area, unless specified otherwise.   
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The basin includes 10 provinces and Ho Chi Minh City.
4  As can be seen in Table 1, the 
DNRB is highly developed, with a relatively low share of agricultural GDP, relatively high 
income per capita, and a high population density, compared with other regions in Vietnam. 
Table 1--Economic indicators for the provinces in the Dong Nai River Basin 
          













  2000  1999 2000 1999 1999 1999 1999 
 (ha)  (ha)  (‘000)  (M  USD)  (%)  (%)  (USD/cap)
Binh  Duong  269,555  20,693  738 376 19  55  29.1 
Binh  Phuoc  685,598  24,844  687 114 65  8  23.6 
Binh Thuan  783,809  71,231  1,066  141  47  21  19.9 
Ba Ria - Vung 
Tau 
190,000 20,762  823  3137  5  82  32.2 
Dak Lak  388,909  12,097  99  433  71  8  27.7 
Dong Nai  589,474  59,188  2,039  878  24  50  31.9 
HCMC 209,505  69,742  5,222  5036  2 44  59.3 
Long  An  188,153  143,147  810 414 53  19  23.2 
Lam Dong  976,440  88,245  1,038  222  60  14  29.1 
Ninh  Thuan  336,006  42,307  516 103 53  13  16.6 
Tay  Ninh  402,812  199,619  979 268 45  19  22.2 
          
TOTAL  5,020,261  751,874  14,018 11,123 14  51   
 
Note: GDP and income refer to the entire province, not just basin area. 
Reference: Land area: Sub-NIAPP; Gross irrigated area: adjusted from SIWRP; Population and GDP: various 
statistical yearbooks; Income per capita: GSO (2001). 
 
  It accounts for slightly more than half of total industrial GDP.  Although, on average, the 
basin population of 14 million people is relatively affluent, there are several poor districts and 
provinces, including large areas in Ninh Thuan and Binh Phuoc provinces and rural districts in 
Binh Thuan, Dak Lak, and Lam Dong provinces.  Although the share of agriculture in total GDP 
has been declining over time, the agricultural sector in the basin is highly diversified and 
dynamic, with products ranging from basic staples like rice and maize to raw materials for the 
                                                 
4 About 19% of Dak Lak, 90% of Lam Dong, and 51% of Long An are included in the basin area.  Unless mentioned 
otherwise, only basin areas of these provinces are referred to.   
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local industry, including cotton, rubber, and sugarcane, to high-valued crops, like coffee, fruit, 
grapes, pepper, tea, and vegetables.   
Total discharge is estimated at 47.065 BCM (billion cubic meters), including about 6-7 
BCM of Mekong flows.  Rainfall averages 2,000 mm, but can be as low as 700 mm in some 
coastal areas.  The DNRB has 5 major rivers: the Dong Nai mainstream, the Be, the Sai Gon, and 
the La Nga as major tributaries, and the Vam Co Dong system that joins the Dong Nai just before 
the outlet into the Sea.  There is one major interbasin transfer to the Cai Basin in the coastal area 
(within the Dong Nai basin planning unit) of around 20 m
3/sec and a second transfer is under 
construction (Figures 1, 2).  
The DNRB ranks second in hydropower potential in the country and in 2000, total 
installed hydropower capacity reached 1,182 MW with average annual power production of 4,881 
GWh.  Total investment cost of existing hydropower projects is estimated at USD 1,105 million 
(including Ham Thuan- Da Mi, Thac Mo, and Tri An reservoirs).  In addition, the basin includes 
Dau Tieng, the largest irrigation reservoir in Vietnam.  Several additional reservoirs are currently 
under construction. 
On the institutional side, several reforms in the water sector have recently impacted upon 
or will impact on the basin in the near future.  In January 1999, a new Water Resources Law went 
into force.  According to the Law, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD)
5 
is in charge of overall management of the country’s water resources, but the Government may 
delegate authority for specific water uses to other ministries; water allocation is carried out from a 
river basin perspective adhering to the principles of fairness and reasonability; priority in use is 
                                                 
5 In November of 2002, following the establishment of the new Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
(MONRE), MONRE was assigned responsibility for state management of water resources as well as other natural 
resources and environment, whereas public water services delivery is to be carried out by MARD and other 
ministries with water-related responsibilities.   
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accorded to drinking water in both quality and quantity (Article 20); and both water use and 
wastewater discharge are to be licensed by provincial government authorities (People’s 
Committees) under the guidance of MARD.  In April of 2001, MARD established a basin 
Planning Management Council for the DNRB.  Detailed operation rules are not yet finalized, but 
it is assumed that in a first phase, the Council will focus on river basin planning.   
The following sections introduce the modeling framework; describe model data and 
validation; and present a baseline and an optimization scenario.  Based on this modeling 
framework the consequences of changes in crop prices and irrigation efficiency, increased trade 
liberalization, and the establishment of water use rights and alternative trading regimes on the 
basin economy are analyzed.  
 
2.  MODELING FRAMEWORK 
In order to support coordination of management in the Dong Nai River Basin, and to 
assist the recently established Dong Nai River Basin Planning Management Council a better 
understanding of water supply, demand, and its value in various uses is needed.  Moreover, an 
understanding of the role of alternative policy instruments in alleviating likely future water 
shortages in the basin is necessary to allocate scarce resources across irrigation, hydropower 
development, and urban water supply demands.  The complexities involved in water allocation 
and use in the Dong Nai River Basin—and any river basin in the world—require a holistic 
approach to the planning and management of its water resources to achieve an optimal utilization 
that is at the same time sustainable, efficient, and equitable (McKinney et al. 1999, Rogers and 
Fiering 1986).   
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The two principal approaches to river basin modeling are simulation—to simulate water 
resources behavior based on a set of rules governing water allocation and infrastructure operation; 
and optimization—to optimize allocation based on an objective function and accompanying 
constraints.  Although simulation and optimization models have differing objectives, they are in 
fact complementary tools to address problems related to the competition over scarce water 
resources and the design and assessment of alternative systems of water allocation. 
The model developed for the DNRB draws on previous economic-hydrologic modeling 
carried out at IFPRI, in particular, for the Maipo River Basin in Chile (Rosegrant et al. 2000).  It 
belongs to the class of integrated economic-hydrologic river basin models and includes 
hydrologic, economic, and institutional components.  The model focus is on the economic 
component.  The river basin model is developed as a node-link network, which is an abstracted 
representation of the spatial relationships between the physical entities in the river basin.  Nodes 
represent river reaches, reservoirs, and demand sites, and links represent the connections between 
these entities (Figure 2).   
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Inflows to these nodes include water flows from the headwaters of the river basin, as well 
as local rainfall drainage.  Flow balances are calculated for each node at each time period, and 
flow transport is calculated based on the spatial linkages in the river basin network. 
For modeling purposes, provinces are considered the major modeling units in the river 
basin model.  Agricultural demand sites are delineated according to 37 sub-catchments and 
administrative boundaries, resulting in 60 irrigation demand sites.
6  For domestic demand sites, 
adjacent districts have been summed up, yielding 48 domestic demand sites.  For industrial water 
use, 12 demand sites are delineated for the provinces with major industrial water use: Ba Ria-
Vung Tau, Binh Duong, HCMC, Dong Nai, as well as several provinces with lower industrial 
development: Binh Thuan, Long An, Ninh Thuan, and Tay Ninh.  The model also incorporates 
the major existing reservoirs for hydropower production, irrigation, and flood control. 
Thematically, the modeling framework includes three components: (1) hydrologic 
components, including the water balance in reservoirs, river reaches, and crop fields; (2) 
economic components, including the calculation of benefits from water uses by sector, demand 
site, and country; and (3) institutional rules and economic incentives that impact upon the 
hydrologic and economic components.  Water supply is determined through the hydrologic water 
balance in the river system; while water demand is determined endogenously within the model 
based on functional relationships between water and productive uses in irrigated agriculture, 
domestic and industrial uses, and hydropower.  Water supply and demand are balanced based on 
the objective of maximizing economic benefits to water use.  Environmental requirements to 
control saltwater intrusion are included as flow constraints.  The time horizon of the model is one 
                                                 
6 Two irrigation demand sites on the West Vam Co River have not been included as they are outside the Dong Nai 
basin planning unit.  
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year with 12 periods (months).  The following section describes the hydrologic and economic 
components in more detail. 
HYDROLOGIC COMPONENT 
Hydrologic relations and processes are based on the flow network.  They include: (1) flow 
transport and balance from river outlets/reservoirs to crop fields, and domestic and industrial 
demand sites; (2) return flows from irrigated areas and urban-industrial areas; (3) reservoir 
releases; (4) instream water uses; and (5) groundwater. 
The basic flow balance at a node in the basin network is calculated as: 
 
    flow_downstream = flow_upstream + local_drainage +      
                                    return_flows - withdrawals – (evaporation) losses   (1) 
 
The rainfall-runoff process is not included in the model.  It is assumed that runoff starts 
from rivers and reservoirs.  Effective rainfall for crop production is calculated outside of the 
model, and included into the model as a constant parameter.  As groundwater data was scarce, the 
exploitation capacity of shallow groundwater was included, and withdrawal estimates as 
available, but groundwater was not modeled separately.  
ECONOMIC COMPONENT 
The objective of the model is to maximize the annual net profits from water uses in 









                      VI         
pw in
in ∑ ∑ ∑∑ + + + = pw
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m a VP VM VA Obj Max 
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VA  net profit from irrigated agriculture 
VM  net benefit from municipal water use 
VI  net profit from industrial production 
VP  net profit from power production 
a, m 
in, pw  indexes for irrigation, domestic, industrial demand sites and power station 
 
Crop Yield Function 
In order to establish a relationship between inputs other than water and crop yield, a 
quadratic production function is chosen (see Eq. 3) due to its properties of decreasing marginal 
returns to additional inputs and substitutability of inputs.   
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where  γ α   and   are the input coefficients, and x are inputs by crop c.  Water inputs in this 
equation are fixed at the yield-maximizing level.  In order to establish a relationship between crop 
yield and water stress, the crop yield-water stress relationship described in Doorenbos and 
Kassam (1979) and Doorenbos and Pruitt (1977) is used. 
 
) / 1 ( * ) 1 ( * M A ETM ET ky yst y − − =       




 y   actual yield (water-stressed) (mt/ha) 
 yst  non-water stressed yield (mt/ha), from the quadratic production function 
 ETA  seasonal actual evapotranspiration (mm) 
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The net profit function for irrigated agriculture is formulated as:  
 




 A   area harvested (ha) 
  W  irrigation water applied (m
3) 
 y   actual yield from FAO relationship, (mt/ha) 
 pc  crop price at farm gate (USD/mt) 
 lc  labor cost (family and hired) (MD/ha) 
 mc  machinery/animal cost (USD/ha) 
 fc fertilizer  cost  (USD/ha) 
 pec  pesticide cost (USD/ha) 
 pw  water fee (USD/m
3) 
 
Domestic Net Benefit Function 
The net benefit function for domestic water uses (VM) is derived from an inverse demand 
function for water.  In a first step, a double-log function is estimated.   
 
() ( ) ( ) mwd P I mwd ln ln ln ⋅ − ⋅ + = ε β ψ       (6) 
where: 
 
mwd  per capita water demand (m
3/cap) 
Ψ constant 
I income  (US$/cap/month) 
Pmwd  price paid for water (US$/m
3) 
ε  price elasticity of demand 
β  income elasticity of demand 
 
The inverse of the demand function is then integrated over the space of mwd0
7 - W to 






                                                 
7 There are no clear guidelines for choosing mwd0.  Here it is defined as a share of actual per capita consumption.  
Thus, consumer surplus here can only be accrued for consumption levels above average demand.  It is not considered 
crucial in this modeling framework, as allocation is driven based on marginal benefits.  
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CS  Consumer Surplus (US$ million) 
mwd
0  per capita normal water demand (m
3/cap) 
Pmwd  price for water, includes urban and rural water and surface and groundwater 
e EXP 
urban, pd 
rural, pop  indexes for urban/rural parameters, for time period (pd) and population (pop) 
 
Industrial Net Profit Function 
A production function approach to industrial water demand, which is conceptually correct 
given that water is an input to a marketed end product, cannot be realized due to the lack of 
industrial survey data.  Therefore, a synthetic willingness-to-pay curve is developed based on the 
observed level of water use, and average, and marginal water use.  Based on a literature review, a 
price elasticity of water demand of 0.71 is chosen (equal to three times the average price elasticity 
for connected and non-connected households in HCMC used in the household water demand 
function).  Second, the mean contribution of water to production cost was assumed to be 0.05.  
Based on these data points, the following function can be estimated: 
 
     (8) 
where: 
 
iwd  industrial water withdrawal (m
3/month) [available] 
µ constant 
θ  price elasticity of industrial water demand [synthesized] 
Piwd  industrial water price (US$/m
3) [available] 
 
Based on the known values of iwd, Piwd, and the estimated θ, the constant can be calculated. 












































iwd  industrial water withdrawals (m
3/month)  
iwd




Hydropower Net Profit Function 
To estimate power production, in a first step, power production efficiency is calculated 
based on daily release and power production data.  Profit from power production (VP) is 
calculated as a linear function, multiplying power production (pow) with the difference between 
power selling price (pp) and power production cost (pc) for each hydropower station. 
 
        (10) 
 
 
3.  MODEL DATA AND VALIDATION 
The model is calibrated to 1999/2000 data.  In the following, data sources for the model 
are briefly described and a run with fixed water allocation (BAS) is compared with selected 
observed data.  
Hydrologic Data 
 
Source flow was determined by the hydrology division of SIWRP (Sub-Institute for Water 
Resources Planning, Ho Chi Minh City) based on a rainfall-runoff model called RRMOD for 
1978-1998 for a total of 37 river nodes/reaches.  Together with the withdrawal nodes, a total of 
82 nodes are included in the model.  Total estimated basin discharge amounts to 47.1 BCM.  As 
these data are ex-post depletion, estimated actual depletion, just under 4 BCM, is added to these 




































amounts to 47.5 BCM.  Figure 3 shows that reservoir releases (average for 1994-1998) at Tri An, 
the largest hydropower reservoir in the basin, compare well with model discharge.   
 
Figure 3--Dong Nai mainstream flow from model compared with average Tri An reservoir 
release (1994-1998) 



















A minimum instream flow requirement for all river reaches in the basin of 10 percent of 
source flow has been included to guarantee basic river habitat.  In addition, estimates for 
minimum flow requirements to control saltwater intrusion and secure safe drinking water supply 
for the lower basin, chiefly HCMC, have been included.  They are 85 m
3/sec for the Dong Nai 
River at Binh An water supply plant and 25 m
3/sec on the Sai Gon at the location of the future 
Ben Than water supply plant.   
AGRICULTURAL DATA 
The parameters for the crop yield function were collected by Sub-NIAPP (Sub-National 
Institute for Agricultural Planning and Projections) in an extensive farm household survey 
covering 700 households in the 11 provinces of the DNRB.  The survey covers the Summer- 
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Autumn season of 1999 to the Winter-Spring season of 2000 (SubNIAPP 2001).  Based on the 
survey data crop yield functions were estimated for the major irrigated annual (bean, maize, 
peanut, rice, sugarcane, tobacco, vegetables) and perennial crops (coffee, fruit tree, other tree, 
pepper) in the basin.  Annual crops are separated by season (Winter-Spring, Summer-Autumn, 
and Rainy Season).  Moreover, paddy and vegetable crops are further subdivided by region 
(coastal area, mountainous area, and lowland area).  The input variables incorporated are in 
USD/ha: labor, machinery, fertilizer, pesticides, and water.  Family labor is valued at the 
prevailing wage rate stipulated by the farm households.  Water includes both estimated irrigation 
water applied and effective rainfall (calculated based on daily rainfall observations prevailing 
over the survey period).  Mean values of major input variables by crop, which are used in the 
model, are shown in Table 2.   
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Table 2--Yield function parameters, area-weighted mean values by crop 
 Price  Yield  Labor  Machinery Fert N  Fert P  Fert K  Pesti-cide  Irr-
Water  ER 
  (USD/mt)  (mt/ha) (MD/ha) (USD/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (USD/ha) (mm) (mm) 
beanDX  484  1  44  46  32 47 20 14  255  28 
coffee  641  3  331  10  314 227 96  74  1352  879 
frtree  310  8  308  6  227 147 61  71  1182  728 
maizeDX  132  6  68  47  82 89 29 24  403  78 
maizeHT  101  6  82  43  61 61 25 18  352  292 
otree  366  33  841  5  963 1025  413 871  1401  403 
peanDX  315  3  99  41  77 101  46 60  363  77 
peanHT  329  1  84  40  48 63 22 28  372  293 
pepper  3392  3  540  20  325 325 138 159  960  597 
riceDXc  107  5  93  36  117  68 22 27  830  82 
riceDXm  120  5  80  44  100  58 21 20  768  146 
riceDXu  111  4  62  34  91 71 26 31  782  181 
riceHTc  111  5  92  35  108  66 24 32  895  397 
riceHTm  113  4  73  46  100  67 18 24  746  573 
riceHTu  104  4  63  33  100  64 28 37  853  430 
riceMUAc  112  4  82  33  97 57 17 28  808  412 
riceMUAm  113  4  81  53  126  53 24 14  773  525 
riceMUAu  108  4  58  27  96 56 16 28  737  436 
sugarc  16  50  140  19  172 131 53  31  1541  608 
tobDX  1299  3  411  32  273 200 94  45  402  105 
vegiDXc  182  19  308  26  241 204 69  100  309  50 
vegiDXm  83  27  243  42  211 228 61  87  250  107 
vegiDXu  134  12  160  46  220 155 21  57  295  114 
vegiHTc  199  19  335  19  272 214 69  106  333  113 
vegiHTm  144  22  251  36  232 320 62  188  269  190 
vegiHTu  122  11  129  52  185 144 20  54  356  253 
vegiMUAc  171  24  385  14  266 194 56  107  257  179 
vegiMUAu  119  14  169  33  222 170 27  56  328  223 
Note: DX = Winter-Spring season; HT = Summer-Autumn season; MUA = Rainy season. 
*Note: Due to a lack of observations for beanHT and beanMUA, the respective values from vegiHTu and 
vegiMUAu were taken. 
 
Irrigation service fees (ISF) in Vietnam for public systems are decided at the province 
level following government guidelines.  ISF are area-based and can vary by crop, season, and 
type of irrigation water supply (gravity or pump irrigation).  Currently, ISF only partially reflect 
the scarcity value of water; fees are typically higher for pump irrigation, but also typically lower 
for rice, which consumes relatively more water.  Survey results indicate average basin ISF of  
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USD 19/ha, USD 12/ha and USD 5/ha for dry-season, summer-autumn season, and rainy season 
paddy, compared to USD 92/ha for perennial coffee plants that are pump-irrigated.  ISF per ha 
were converted to volumetric values for modeling purposes. 
There are no consistent databases for irrigated area and irrigation sources in Vietnam.  
Sub-NIAPP estimates gross irrigated area for 1999/2000 of 819,136 ha, whereas SIWRP 
estimates an area of 781,349 ha.  Irrigated areas for upland crops are not separated in statistics on 
irrigation.  For this analysis, they were distributed according to statistical yearbooks on total area 
and survey results.  It was assumed that only perennial crops are irrigated with groundwater.  
Estimated yield function and production costs are applied to the gross irrigated area for 1999 of 
759,480 ha.   
DOMESTIC WATER USE DATA 
Domestic water delivery data was collected from the various water supply companies in 
the basin.  Water loss rates in the basin range from 19 percent for Ba Ria-Vung Tau (BRVT) 
province to 49 percent in Trang Bang, Tay Ninh province.  Water tariffs from public supply 
companies were included as available.  About half of the companies apply progressive block 
tariffs.  Average rates vary from VND 1,600/m
3 (USD 0.11/m
3) for Long An province to VND 
2,529/m
3 (USD 0.18/m
3) in Da Lat City, Lam Dong province.  For individual pumping and most 
rural domestic water uses, a supply cost of USD 0.1/m
3 was assumed.  Public water supply 
companies serve only about 60 percent of the population of major cities, and people with 
household connections consume, on average, substantially more than non-connected households.  
For those districts and areas without public supply, a minimum supply standard of 40-50 
l/cap/day was assumed.  This results in total domestic water supply of about 920,500 m
3/day and 




The parameters for the domestic benefit function were estimated separately for connected 
and non-connected households based on the 1995 household water demand behavior survey 
carried out by GKW/SAFEGE (GKW/SAFEGE 1996).  The survey was carried out in the 12 
inner and four peripheral districts of HCMC.  The price and income elasticities estimated were 
then applied to other districts in the basin, following adjustments for rural-urban shares (to which 
non-connected and connected parameters were applied, respectively), rural-urban incomes, and 
rural-urban consumption shares.   
INDUSTRIAL WATER USE DATA 
Industrial water use estimates for the Dong Nai basin have ranged from 130-2,500 MCM 
(million cubic meters) per year (Ngoc Anh 2000 and Boggs 1995, respectively).  For this study, 
industrial water use was collected from the industrial zones of the four major industrial provinces 
in the basin (BRVT, Binh Duong, HCMC, and Dong Nai).  However, water supply data for these 
zones was sparse.  Moreover, substantial industrial production takes places outside of designated 
industrial zones.  Industrial water supply data was also collected from municipal water supply 
companies in the various provinces in the basin.  As these data were still not sufficient, industrial 
water use was estimated based on the water use coefficients for industrial products presented in 
Boggs (1995, see Boggs’ Table 6).  
In 1999, total net industrial water demand was estimated at 287 MCM, 44 percent of 
which was delivered from surface water sources, the remainder from private or industrial zone 
managed wells.  The water tariff that public water companies charge to industries varies little 
among provinces and is usually a flat rate.  Among the provinces with available data, the rate is  
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lowest in Long An at VND 2,600/m
3 (USD 0.19/m
3) and highest in Binh Thuan at VND 4,500/m
3 
(USD 0.32/m
3).   
HYDROPOWER DATA 
Power production parameters in the model include efficiency estimates computed from 
historic daily reservoir release data, operation rules, dead and maximum storage, maximum 
turbine flow, and area-storage and elevation-storage relationships.  Figure 4 presents the 
operation curve for Tri An, together with historic storage values and model outcomes.  The graph 
shows that reservoir operation curves in place are not adhered to religiously in the basin.  Figure 
5, which compares power production from model results and historic data for Da Nhim reservoir, 
shows that the model replicates current production levels well.  Hydropower production costs, 
supplied by PECC2, for the major stations, range from USD 0.012/kWh for Thac Mo to USD 
0.033/kWh for Ham Thuan and Da Mi stations; and electricity selling prices range from USD 
0.038/kWh for Tri An to USD 0.07/kWh for Da Nhim station.  For analysis purposes, it is 
assumed that hydropower profits accrue to those provinces where the reservoir is located.  
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The model has been coded in the GAMS modeling language, a high-level modeling system for 
mathematical programming problems.  It consists of 50,317 single equations (rows) and 117,691 
single variables (columns) with 185,034 non-zero coefficients.  The CONOPT3 solver for highly 
nonlinear problems has been used to solve the model. 
 
 
 4.  BASELINE (BAS) AND OPTIMIZATION (OPT) RESULTS  
BAS attempts to recreate the water allocation and use situation prevailing in 1999/2000.  
This can usually not be achieved through full optimization, because optimized allocation is based 
on a partial incorporation of the reality into the modeling framework, and because the logic of the 
modeling approach assumes economic efficiency as the main driving force for water allocation 
across time and space, with perfect in- and foresight into the scarcity value of water in its various 
uses.  For BAS, water allocations to various sectors are fixed.  In the irrigation sector, crop yield 
and crop production inputs, including labor, fertilizer, and water are fixed at average levels, for 
example.  Moreover, irrigated crop area allocation levels are fixed.  Power is produced within 
operating rules. 
Full optimization (OPT) presumes an omniscient decision-maker, which can be 
represented, for example, through the Dong Nai River Basin Organization.  However, transaction 
costs for full optimization of basin resources in the real world would be tremendous.  For OPT, 
irrigated area ranges from 0.2-1.5 of observed irrigated area, and crop inputs other than water are 
within a range from 0.8-1.2 of average input levels.  Domestic demand is within a range of 0.7-
1.15 of observed demand, and industrial demand within a range of 0.5-1.5 of actual demand.  




Under BAS, total off-stream water withdrawals from surface sources are estimated at 
6,157 MCM, 12 percent of total runoff.  Minimum flow requirements for drinking water on the 
Dong Nai and Sai Gon Rivers account for a further 3,469 MCM.  Surface withdrawal shares are 
89 percent for irrigation, 5 percent for domestic uses, and 5 percent for industrial water uses.  In 
addition, total groundwater abstractions amount to 705 MCM or 6.9 percent of total shallow 
groundwater capacity.  About 292 MCM are pumped for irrigation, 163 MCM for domestic uses, 
and 251 MCM for industrial uses.  Total power production amounts to 5,287 GWh.  Under the 
OPT scenario, water can be allocated more freely across sectors, following optimization 
objectives, within the bounds specified above, and the physical and system control constraints 
and minimum instream and downstream flow requirements.  Under this scenario, surface water 
withdrawals increase to 6,353 MCM; and groundwater pumping increases by 4 percent.  
Compared to BAS, gross irrigated area under OPT drops by 75,000 ha.  The decline is largest for 
rice crops, but coffee area declines as well.  Area under upland crops, on the other hand, increases 
by 55,000 ha (see also Figure 6).  Increases are particularly large for peanut in the dry season and 
vegetables in the rainy season.  
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Figure 7 presents the distribution of natural flows, model discharge, and water demands 
(including instream flow demands for drinking water in HCMC) across the year for the BAS 




















































First, it shows clearly the large variation in flow between the dry and rainy seasons, ever 
after construction of three major reservoirs in the basin.  Second, the graph shows that the 
construction of these reservoirs has been vital to prevent water shortages in the dry season, as 
demands surpass natural (prior to storage) flows during February to April, by between 164 MCM 
and 339 MCM.  Overall, the DNRB can be characterized as an ‘open’ river basin based on this 
graph, as excess water is available, over and above all committed legal, ecological and 
environmental requirements, even during the dry season.  However, the basin will likely soon 
approach a ‘semi-closed’ state, where sufficient water resources are available during the rainy 
season, but off-stream and instream water needs compete with each other during the dry season.  
In so-called ‘closed’ basins, finally, there is no excess water flowing out of the basin; all water 
resources are committed to use (Keller, Sakthivadivel, and Seckler 2000).  The latter state is 




































Table 3 presents net profit per hectare and the productivity of irrigation water for irrigated 
basin crops under BAS and OPT.   
Table 3--Net profit per hectare and productivity of irrigation water by 
crop, BAS and OPT 
  Profit per ha  Profit per m
3 
 BAS  OPT  BAS  OPT 
  (US$/ha)  (US$/m
3) 
otree 9074  9238 0.43 0.44 
pepper 5654  6027  1.40  1.09 
tobDX 3463  3578  0.39  0.40 
vegiHTc 2380  2629  0.29  0.32 
vegiMUAc 2248  2595  0.58  0.67 
vegiDXc 2205  2455  0.36  0.41 
vegiHTm 2181  2475  0.48  0.55 
vegiMUAm 1406  1429  1.20  1.22 
vegiDXm 1175  1275  0.26  0.28 
vegiDXu 1131  1211  0.25  0.28 
frtree 1069  1879 0.12  0.21 
vegiHTu 870  911  0.29  0.31 
beanHT 844  886  0.17  0.18 
beanMUA 801  856  0.33  0.36 
vegiMUAu 800  855  0.31  0.33 
peanDX 574  588  0.07  0.07 
maizeDX 438  470  0.05  0.05 
coffee 358  505  0.06  0.06 
maizeHT 311  323  0.15  0.16 
peanHT 261  276  0.12  0.13 
riceHTm 164  128  0.03  0.04 
beanDX 152  232  0.03  0.03 
riceMUAu 129  182  0.02  0.02 
riceDXu 126  205  0.01  0.01 
riceHTc 85  227  0.01  0.01 
sugarc 81  278  0.01  0.02 
riceDXc 80  222  0.01  0.01 
riceMUAc 77  194  0.01  0.02 
riceMUAm 53  122  0.02  0.03 
riceHTu 39  147  0.01  0.02 
DX = Winter-Spring, HT = Summer-Autumn, MUA = Rainy Season; c = coastal area 
(BRVT, Binh Thuan, and Ninh Thuan;  m = mountainous area (Binh Phuoc, Dak Lak, and 
Lam Dong provinces); u = lower basin (Binh Duong, Dong Nai, HCMC, Long An, and Tay 
Ninh). 
 
Net profits per hectare are largest for the category ‘other tree’ (including grapes and 
mulberry trees) and pepper, followed by tobacco and some of the vegetable crops.  Profits per ha 
are lowest for sugarcane and some of the paddy crops.  At the lower end, there is significant  
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variation between the BAS and OPT scenarios, as the flexible adjustment of inputs other than 
water under OPT helps avoid some of the low crop profits in the BAS scenario.   
The productivity of irrigation water, defined as USD/m
3, depends on both the profitability 
of the crop and its need for irrigation water, which again is determined by growing season, 
growing length, and climatic factors.  Baseline results indicate that water productivity is high for 
vegetables planted in the highland areas and the summer-autumn season.  This is because these 
crops consume very little irrigation water.  Among the non-vegetable crops, pepper, ‘other tree’ 
and tobacco stand out as crops with relatively high profit per unit of water consumed.  
Unsurprisingly, water productivity is lowest for sugarcane and various paddy crops.   
 
 
5.  ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analyses are carried out to test the robustness of baseline results.  Parameters 
tested include changes in the climatic situation—inflows and effectively usable rainfall—changes 
in the efficiency with which water resources are being used at the field and at the level of primary 
and secondary canals.  The final sensitivity analysis refers to changes in selected agricultural 
commodity prices.  Results are presented in Table 4.  
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Table 4--Sensitivity analysis, various parameters (comparison with opt, percentage values) 



























                   
0.6  90.2  100.0 100.0 71.9  94.4  100.0  66.3  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Low flow (%) 
0.5  87.7  100.0 100.0 62.8  92.8  99.5 64.5  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
0.5  87.5  100.0 100.0 100.1  96.6  100.0  69.0  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0  Field-application 
Efficiency
/a  0.9  110.5 100.0 100.0 99.9  102.8  100.0  104.6 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
0.60  105.4 100.0 100.0 99.9  101.5  100.0  71.2  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 




/b  0.375  92.2  100.0 100.0 100.1  97.9  100.0  106.7 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
1998  130.5 100.0 100.0 99.9  108.3  100.0  106.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0  Coffee/Pepper 
Price Changes  2001  82.4  100.0 100.0 100.8  95.3  97.3 23.8  100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
                   
Note: Runs are based on OPT. 





During a dry-year case, represented by 60 percent and 50 percent of average inflows and 
effective rainfall, respectively, farm incomes from irrigated agriculture drop to 90 percent and 88 
percent of OPT levels, respectively.  Profits from hydropower production decline similarly, to 72 
percent and 63 percent, respectively, as less flows are available to keep the turbines operating.  
Under both dry-case scenarios, groundwater pumping for irrigation drops significantly, to 66 
percent and 65 percent of OPT levels, respectively, due to the increase in domestic and industrial 
pumping—which dominate over irrigation pumping—to compensate for reduced surface water 
availability.  Domestic and industrial water use benefits are not affected due to their high 
marginal return to water usage. 
Irrigation Efficiency 
One important means to reduce water losses is the improvement of on-farm field 
efficiency.  In the baseline scenario, field application efficiency is estimated at 0.7, that is, 70 
percent of the water applied at the field level is used beneficially by plants.  If the field 
application efficiency level were increased to 0.9 (and thus overall efficiency to 45 percent), for 
example, through investments in irrigation technology in the entire basin, then irrigation profits 
would increase to 111 percent of OPT levels (an increase of USD 42 million), and hydropower 
profits would decline by a very small amount (a reduction of USD 0.1 million).  Increased on-
farm efficiency would make low-profit crops relatively more feasible, and both irrigated area and 
groundwater pumping would increase.  The annual cost of increased on-farm efficiency, not 
incorporated here, should not surpass the estimated increase in net benefits from irrigation 




When field application efficiency is reduced to 0.5, however, that is only half of the water 
arriving at the field can be used effectively for crop evapotranspiration (and thus overall 
efficiency is reduced to 25 percent down from 35 percent), then irrigation profits drop to 88 
percent of OPT levels.  The relatively more expensive groundwater pumping would decline to 69 
percent of OPT levels.  This decline would be compensated by increased surface water 
withdrawals.   
The Government of Vietnam is currently undertaking a large investment project to line 
irrigation canals to reduce water losses.  The total investment plan over the 1999-2005 period 
amounts to USD 758 million for all of Vietnam.  The investment funds have several sources.  
Most of the funds will be allocated from MARD and based on Decision No. 66.  However, a 
substantial share will also be sourced from ISF and the land tax, and the reminder from the 
farmers themselves.  At USD 52 million, the canal lining investments planned and ongoing in the 
Dong Nai Basin are relatively small compared to the overall investment schedule (7 percent of 
the total), but are still substantial.  Irrigation management companies hope to increase conveyance 
and distribution efficiency following canal lining from 0.7 to 0.9 (IMC Ninh Thuan and IMC Cu 
Chi, personal communication); these estimates (including the original levels) appear somewhat 
optimistic.  In the baseline, conveyance and distribution efficiency combined are estimated at 0.5.  
If the ongoing canal lining would increase the conveyance and distribution efficiency 
across the basin to a level of 0.75 (translating into an overall efficiency level of 0.53), then profits 
from irrigation would increase to 112 percent of OPT levels (or an increase by USD 50 million), 
at the same time that irrigation withdrawals would decline.  Groundwater pumping for irrigation 
purposes would decline dramatically, to 64 percent of OPT levels—a reduction by 95 MCM—as 
cheaper surface water would become more abundant, whereas surface withdrawals would 
increase by 65 MCM.  Increased irrigation surface withdrawals, in turn, would lead to a slight  
 
30
reduction in profits from hydropower production (USD 0.3 million annually).  Thus, at this 
increase in efficiency, the canal lining investment appears to be a viable option, compared to 
costs incurred.  
If the ongoing canal lining activities would increase the combined conveyance and 
distribution efficiency levels to a value of 0.6 only (translating into an overall efficiency level of 
0.42), then the additional respective annual profits would be only USD 22 million.  In this case, 
total irrigation withdrawals would not decline, with a reduction of irrigation pumping of 76 MCM 
completely offset by an increase in surface withdrawals (Table 4).  Thus, no water savings would 
be achieved at the basin level.   
If, on the other hand, maintenance on primary and secondary canals is deferred—as is 
currently happening in many Vietnamese irrigation systems—the combined conveyance and 
distribution efficiency might decline to a level of 0.38 based on an increase in canal losses of 25 
percent (and translating into an overall efficiency level of 26 percent).  In this case, irrigation 
profits would drop to 92 percent of OPT levels (a drop by USD 31 million).  The resulting 
decline in surface irrigation water withdrawals (18 MCM) would be compensated by an increase 
in groundwater pumping to 107 percent of OPT levels and total basin profits would decline to 98 
percent of OPT values (decline by USD 31 million).  Thus, even if the canal-lining project would 
not be implemented, it is clear that deferring maintenance on public irrigation systems will cause 
long-term costs to the irrigation sector in the Dong Nai Basin and Vietnam.  
Finally, the outcomes for irrigation profits are larger for changes in on-farm field 
efficiency as they apply to both surface and groundwater irrigation sources.   
Commodity Price Changes 
Several major agricultural commodities experienced sharp declines in Vietnam and 
elsewhere over the past few years.  Although the rice price in Vietnam has dropped significantly  
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in the Mekong Delta over this period, prices in the DNRB remained stable due to the relatively 
lower quantity and higher quality of rice produced.  To evaluate the impact of recent price 
changes on farmer incomes, alternative simulations are carried out for the 1998 and 2001 coffee 
and pepper prices, which are major cash crops affected by the price decline.  Converted to US 
dollars, the prices implemented in the model are for coffee: USD 1,033/mt, USD 641/mt, and 
USD 372/mt, for 1998, survey year (1999/2000), and 2001, respectively—a drop by a factor of 
2.7 over three years—and for pepper: USD 4,590/mt, USD 3,392/mt, and USD 1,149/mt, a drop 




If the 1998 coffee and pepper prices would prevail, irrigation profits would increase to 
131 percent over OPT values, and total basin profits to 108 percent.  For the case of 2001 coffee 
and pepper prices, profits from irrigated agriculture drop to 82 percent of OPT values, and total 
profits decline to 95 percent of OPT values.  In the latter case, total irrigation withdrawals decline 
slightly.  Moreover, agricultural pumping, which is a major water source for pepper and coffee 
crops, drops sharply, to 24 percent of OPT levels, while profits from hydropower production 








































POLICY ANALYSIS—WATER USE RIGHTS (WRI), BROKERAGE MECHANISM (BRK), 
AND MARKET CLEARING (MC) SCENARIOS  
The Vietnam Water Law of 1999 calls for a permit system that applies to both surface and 
groundwater.  Use rights for groundwater are granted for a period of 15 years and for surface 
water for a period of 20 years.  The permit system only applies to large-scale users.  Small 
quantities—chiefly for household uses and small-scale uses in agriculture, forestry, aquaculture, 
and other home enterprises—are not included in the permit system.  In times of water shortages, 
domestic uses get priority over irrigation, industrial, hydropower, and environmental uses.  At the 
absence of the implementation of these regulations, allocation is currently controlled implicitly 
through the investment decision-making process.  Public agencies and companies, through public 
investments in new water-using facilities, determine de facto the basic allocation of surface water 
among users.  Such uses include irrigation schemes, hydropower stations, ports, and municipal  
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water supply systems.  Moreover, in the absence of enforced water use rights, the construction of 
new infrastructure implicitly reallocates water among the various sectors, without compensating 
potential historic users of this water. 
Experience in several developed and developing countries has shown that as economies 
develop, and more infrastructure is being built, water is typically reallocated from the agriculture 
sector to the rapidly growing urban and industrial sectors (Rosegrant and Ringler 1998).  This 
process can threaten the livelihoods of irrigating farmers and associated rural economies.  The 
establishment of water use rights (WRI), as envisioned in the Vietnam Water Law, and as 
recently detailed in decisions passed by the Government, could empower water users in all 
sectors, as it establishes both rights and responsibilities to specified water use.  If water shifts to 
other, typically urban and industrial sectors, irrigators and other users would need to be 
compensated. However, this requires that representatives of irrigating farmers, like Water User 
Associations, farmer cooperatives, or Irrigation and Drainage Management companies are 
allocated use rights, as farmers are exempted/excluded in the current legislation.  Moreover, 
establishing water rights can serve as an incentive to invest in productive water uses, as there is 
some security to be able to use the water for a prolonged period.  Furthermore, water use rights 
provide incentives for all sectors to invest in water-saving technologies, as water outside of the 
existing water use right would have to be obtained at a certain cost, and—in well-developed 
water use right systems—water can be traded, that is, purchased and sold, among sectors.   
 
The establishment of water use rights together with the possibility to sell unused use 
rights to an agency or to purchase additional use rights, if the water can be used productively, can 
help poorer farmers to obtain additional income.  The implications of this type of system—which  
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can be implemented in the form of a brokerage mechanism (BRK)—on water allocation, use, and 
farmer incomes, and overall basin profits will be examined in the following.   
 
In practice, there have been both positive and somewhat less successful experiences 
regarding the implementation of brokerage mechanisms (also called clearinghouses or 
charge/subsidy systems).  These systems have so far typically been employed to control air and 
water pollution.  Wang and Chen (1999) present a positive outcome of the application of a 
charge/subsidy system in China to control industrial pollution.  In particular, this system provided 
the Chinese industries with incentives to decrease pollution levels.  Another case study in France 
has shown that too much bureaucracy can undermine the effectiveness of charge/subsidy systems 
(Glachant 1999). 
If (water) economies are more advanced, a Market Clearing (MC) mechanism can be 
introduced that ensures that the volume of water being sold by all users equals the volume being 
purchased by other users within the same sector or across sectors across specified time periods, 
here months.  The implementation of market clearing mechanisms requires more sophisticated 
communication and information systems compared to the introduction of a water brokerage 
system.  
The establishment of water use rights is a highly complex task and requires the 
determination of many aspects to ensure its workability.  For example, in the case of Vietnam, the 
allocation of water use rights to groups of farmers (Water User Associations) or Irrigation and 
Drainage Management Companies (IMCs) requires the determination of initial allocation rules.   
  Possibilities for initial allocation include:  
-  designed capacity of extraction works 
-  actual capacity of extraction works  
-  historical water use pattern  
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-  estimated water needs (WRCS 2000). 
 
Each type of initial rights allocation will have significant consequences for the equity, 
efficiency, and viability and sustainability of the water rights system.  The water use right 
scenarios implemented here envision a system where water users are registered in some form 
with a basin agency or authority or similar; and that the registered use confers both rights to use 
the amount registered as well as the responsibility to use this water in an efficient manner.  
Moreover, an alternative scenario envisions the future purchase and sale of these water use rights, 
to allow water to move into higher-valued uses without compromising the incomes of irrigating 
farmers.   
 
For WRI, water rights are established for all demand sites reflecting historic usage under 
BAS.  For the BRK scenario, in addition to the water use rights, a brokerage mechanism is 
implemented.  All off-stream sectors can sell water up to their water use right allotment to a 
brokerage agency or clearinghouse (which could be the river basin agency), which compensates 
the users at a fixed water price, and then can relocate the resource to other sectors that might want 
to purchase sources in addition to their own water rights.  Sales and purchases are implemented 
on a monthly basis.  Thus, a demand site can buy in the dry season and sell during the wet season, 
for example.  If the water sold to the agency is not allocated to other off-stream sectors, it 
enhances instream flows.  The water price at which the agency buys and sells—the agency water 
price—is fixed exogenously and is the same for all sectors (under full water market conditions, 
the water price at which various water users at different locations in the system are willing to sell 
or buy water can be revealed through the shadow price).  Two alternative agency prices are set at 
USD 0.02/m
3 and at USD 0.06/m
3.  A third set of scenarios includes a market clearing 
mechanism (MC) in addition to the brokerage mechanism.  That is, water use rights that are sold  
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or bought to an agency need to be equal in volume.  Thus, the agency costs are limited to 
transaction costs.  Costs for the establishment and management (transaction costs) of a brokerage 
and market mechanism are difficult to estimate.  For the purpose here it is assumed that the 
brokerage incurs transaction costs of USD 0.01/m
3 purchased/sold and the market clearing 
mechanism faces costs of USD 0.03/m
3 traded among sectors.  Net water trade equals zero.  As 
the model optimizes over the entire basin, a provision is included for the BRK and MC scenarios 
that no individual demand site can be worse off than under the WRI case.  The alternative 
scenarios are implemented based on the OPT scenario, that is, they include variation in area, 
yield, and crop inputs, and are based on the BAS for initial water use right allocation. 
Table 5 presents selected results for the water use right scenarios with the alternatives of 




Table 5--Selected results from water trading analysis, WRI, BRK and MC scenarios  
 WRI  BRK 0.02  BRK 0.06   MC 0.02  MC 0.06
Agency-fixed trading price (USD/m
3) 0.02 0.06 0.02  0.06
Irrigation Profit (M USD)  401 486 387 435  434
Domestic Benefit (M USD)  687 1,057 1,057 1,057  1,057
Industrial Benefit (M USD)  155 162 160 161  161
Hydropower Profit (M USD)  155 153 154 154  154
Total Profit (M USD)  1,397 1,858 1,757 1,806  1,805
Total water withdrawals (MCM)  6,309 9,670 3,923 6,326  6,334
Irrigation withdrawals (MCM)  5,615 8,719 3,054 5,411  5,430
Irrigated area (in '000 ha)  678 904 497 685  693
Government income/(cost) (M USD)  33.8 -74.6 0.0  0.0
Farmer sells (buys) (M USD)  -27.4 89.1 5.7  16.5
Dom. Sector sells (buys) (M USD)  -4.3 -12.4 -4.2  -12.6
Industry sells (buys) (M USD)  -2.1 -2.1 -1.5  -3.9
Quantity of water traded (MCM)  1,690 1,485 284  275
Average farm income per ha (USD/ha)  591 538 779 635  627
Average irrigation water per ha (m
3/ha) 8,279 9,646 6,147 7,898  7,836
Note: See also Figure 9. 
 
When a brokerage mechanism (BRK) system is introduced, water withdrawals increase 
significantly compared to the fixed rights system, even though water users have to pay for 
additional water.  The agency-fixed sale/purchase price is crucial for the determination of the 
agency net income or loss.  In the case of a price of USD 0.02/m
3 all sectors are net buyers and a 
total of 1,690 MCM are purchased under BRK, for example.  Thus, the agency has a net income 
USD 34 million from water sales for the river basin as a whole.  At the same time, gross irrigation 
withdrawals increase to 8.7 BCM.  All sectors with established water use rights gain from the 
clearinghouse mechanism.  However, the benefits to instream uses, like hydropower, and 
environmental uses, decline as they do not have water use rights accorded based on the Water 
Law and reflected in the river basin model.  Moreover, although total profits in the irrigation 
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intensive crops are brought into production.  As a result, profits decline on a per hectare basis, 
compared to the system with fixed water rights (from USD 591/ha to USD 538/ha).   
If the water price in the BRK system is set at a higher level, here USD 0.06/m
3, it is more 
profitable for many irrigation systems to sell part of their water use right to the water agency 
instead of continuing to use the full share of allocated use rights.  All in all, the water agency 
purchases 1.2 BCM worth of water at a net cost of USD 74.6 million.  This is due to the fact that 
the volume of water sold by farmers at this higher water price is far larger than the volume of 
additional water demanded by the domestic and industrial sectors (see also Table 5 and Figure 9).   













Due to the large sales of water from irrigated agriculture, the volume of gross agricultural 
water withdrawals declines to 3.1 BCM and irrigated area drops to 0.497 million hectares.  As a 
result, profits from irrigated agriculture alone under the higher water price of USD 0.06/m
3 are 
lower compared to the irrigation profits at the agency set price of USD 0.02/m
3.  However, the  
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important result is that under the higher water price, profit from irrigated agriculture on a per 
hectare basis is significantly higher compared to the WRI scenario and compared to the BRK 
scenario at the lower agency-set price (USD 779/ha, versus USD 591/ha and USD 538/ha).  At 
the price offered for the water use right, irrigating farmers make a substantial share of their use 
rights available to other off-stream users (or the environment), while investing their remaining 
water resources into those crops that are more profitable per cubic meter of water (“crop per 
drop”).  Thus, water moves to higher-valued uses, without income losses to the irrigation sector.  
Gross water trade reaches a level of 1.485 BCM.   
If in addition to the brokerage mechanism, a market clearing mechanism is introduced, 
that is, net sales of water use rights across all sectors need to equal net purchases of water use 
rights across all sectors. In that case, the brokerage agency does not incur gains and losses apart 
from transaction costs.  As a balance has to be reached between the water use rights available 
intended for sale and the demand for additional water use rights, the volume of purchases and 
sales drops compared to the BRK scenarios.  Whereas the quantity of water traded was 1,690 
MCM under BRK 0.02 (that is at the agency set price of USD 0.02/m
3) and 1,485 MCM under 
BRK 0.06 the corresponding volumes under the market clearing mechanism drop to 284 MCM 
under MC 0.02 and 275 MCM under MC 0.06, respectively.  Moreover, under all MC scenarios, 
on average, irrigated areas, which have generally lower profits “per drop” of water compared to 
usage in industry and households, are net sellers of waters, whereas the latter are net buyers of the 
resource (Figure 9).  At the higher agency price, the trade in water use rights under MC increases 
substantially in monetary but not volume terms, with irrigation demand site incomes from water 
sales increasing from USD 5.7 million to USD 16.5 million.  Although net farm income per ha 
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if no one purchases this water—net profits per hectare irrigated are still larger compared to the 
WRI case.   
Figure 10 presents the outcomes of the alternative water use right scenarios for the items 
of profit and water withdrawals per ha irrigated.  As the graph shows, irrigation withdrawals on a 
per hectare basis are largest when water in addition to the initial water use rights can be 
purchased at a low price and without purchase limits.   


















Irrigation profits on a per ha basis are largest under the BRK scenario at the higher 
agency-fixed price, as in this case farmers tend to sell water in low-value rice irrigation to more 
profitable uses, while maintaining irrigated areas for higher-valued crops, where the profit per 
cubic meter of water applied is typically higher as well.  Under the MC scenarios, purchases and 
sales of water follow market-clearing rules.  At the lower water price of USD 0.02/m
3, irrigation 
demand sites are unable to purchase water as domestic and industrial sectors themselves strive to 
purchase water from lower-value irrigation.  At the higher water price, trade is even more limited, 
as domestic and industrial sectors purchase less water than the irrigation sector might be willing 


















Water trade: Inc / Cost
Irrigation Profit (M USD)
Other profits/benefits
irrigation withdrawals per ha are still lower compared to the WRI scenario; thus the combined 
objective of improved farmer incomes and water savings can be achieved under both alternative 
scenarios, the brokerage mechanism and market clearing.   
Figure 11 presents the income of farmers from irrigation activities and from sale of water 
use rights.   





















At the lower water price, USD 0.02/m
3, irrigation demand sites are net purchasers of 
water under the BRK scenario, spending a total of USD 27.4 million on additional water use 
rights, 5.6 percent of total irrigation profits, 20 percent of total surface irrigation withdrawals, and 
19 percent of total irrigation withdrawals.  Under the higher water price, irrigating farmers are net 
sellers of water, obtaining a total of 23 percent of total irrigation profits from water sales, and 
selling 33 percent of total irrigation withdrawals (or 3 percent of total basin discharge).  Under 
the MC scenario, where irrigation sites are net sellers at both specified water prices, incomes 
from water sales are USD 5.7 million (1.3 percent of total irrigation profits) and USD 16.5  
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million (3.8 percent of total irrigation profits) under the water prices of USD 0.02/m
3 and USD 
0.06/m
3, respectively.  Under market-clearing conditions, water sales out of agriculture reach 5 
percent of total surface withdrawals under both alternative agency-set water prices.  
As the Dong Nai basin economy develops and water becomes scarcer, the agency price 
could be increased to reflect the increasing value of water in the basin, thus prompting additional 
water sales and investments in water-saving technologies in irrigated agriculture as well as in the 
purchasing water-use sectors.   
OPEN ECONOMY, INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES– TRDLIB 
During the last decade or so, Vietnam has become a major or even the largest player in 
some international agricultural commodity markets, including pepper, coffee, and rice.  
Moreover, Vietnam has recently joined ASEAN and considers participation in the WTO.  
Increased participation in international agricultural commodity markets and increased openness to 
trade has led to the removal of most distortionary export taxes and import quotas that have been 
in place in the past, but it has also exposed local producers to the price fluctuations prevalent in 
some of these international markets, particularly rice. 
The Open Economy and International Linkages Scenario, TRDLIB, assumes a 
continuation of these trends culminating in the full removal of primary economic distortions 
(taxes, subsidies) that affect agricultural production (and hence agricultural water use).  The Dong 
Nai basin economy, centered on irrigated crop production, is linked to global conditions via 
internationally established prices of inputs (fertilizers, energy, for example) and outputs 
(agricultural commodities).  Farmers face producer prices set in international markets and 
mediated by costs of inland transportation, storage and marketing margins.  The scenario does not 
take into account secondary effects of increased trade liberalization, like a reduction in the  
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marketing margins, which will likely occur as the powers accorded to few traders are gradually 
relaxed during the increased opening to international markets and the larger introduction of 
competitiveness in markets.  Moreover, the large remaining industrial protection levels (for 
example in the sugarcane industry) are not examined under this scenario.  
As a study by Barker et al. (2002) shows, overall subsidy and taxation levels in the 
agriculture sector have declined substantially over the last two decades.  In 1999/2000, estimated 
average net protection rates reached –7 percent for rice, -7.5 percent for coffee, -13 percent for 
pepper, + 7.5 percent for tobacco, +112 percent for sugarcane (1998-1999 average, industrial 
protection), and +16.5 for urea.  The case of urea is particularly significant.  Urea protection rates 
vary across time, but have been significant and geared at protecting the local fertilizer industry.  
Based on the IFPRI-SubNIAPP farm household survey, farmers paid between USD 381-1500 per 
metric ton of nitrogen equivalent fertilizer.
8  As the CIF border price of urea was USD 105 per 
metric ton in 1999, and the estimated wholesale price about USD 157 per metric ton in 
1999/2000, farmers, on average, were taxed heavily for fertilizer inputs.  Distortions are lower for 
other fertilizers, like potash and potassium, because they are mostly imported.  If remaining trade 
barriers would be removed, domestic prices received by farmers would increase for rice, coffee, 
pepper, and decline for tobacco.  Urea fertilizer costs to farmers would decline significantly 
(Barker et al., 2002).  The case of sugarcane is different.  Here it is the industry that is heavily 
protected.
9 
                                                 
8 The average elemental nitrogen cost of rice farmers ranged from USD 382-616 per metric ton.  Urea has a 
concentration of about 45 percent of elemental nitrogen.  Thus, farmers paid about USD 171-684 per metric ton of 
urea. 
9 A study by CIE (2001) showed that liberalization of sugar imports would increase the real income of Vietnam by 
some USD 82 million each year, and sugarcane production would decline.  As the profit per ha for sugarcane is 
already quite low, no further changes were made to the sugarcane price received by farmers resulting from the 
removal of the protection for the sugarcane industry.  
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The objectives of the TRDLIB scenario are to analyze the outcomes for cropping patterns, 
water allocation, and farm incomes of the removal of primary remaining distortions in 
agricultural input and output markets.  In order to implement the trade liberalization scenario, the 
protection/taxation levels were removed for the irrigated crops in the basin model, that is, rice 
prices were increased by 7 percent, coffee prices by 7.5 percent, and pepper prices by 13 percent; 
and tobacco prices were reduced by 7.5 percent, and urea prices by 16.5 percent.  This scenario 
was analyzed based on the 2010 projected Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenario with flexible area 
allocation.  
 
The removal of remaining taxes on fertilizer (urea), rice, coffee, and pepper will lead to 
direct annual farm income increases of USD 89 million.  As a result, total annual profits increase 
from USD 4,676 million under BAU to USD 4,765 million under the alternative TRDLIB 
scenario (2010 projections).  Lam Dong province experiences the largest yearly benefits, at USD 
25 million, followed by Binh Phuoc, at USD 13 million, and Binh Thuan, at USD 10 million.  
Figure 12 shows the changes in profitability per hectare for the three major crop types.  Profit per 
ha increases most for rice crops, by 22 percent (from USD 182/ha to USD 223/ha), followed by 
perennial crops, by 13 percent (from USD 1,465/ha to USD 1,658/ha), and upland crops by 0.4 

















































The large increase in profitability of rice crops is due to the combination of larger 
received output prices and reduced fertilizer input costs.  This applies similarly to the large 
increase in profitability observed for perennial crops.  Here the share of fertilizer in total 
production cost is the reason for the large increase in profitability.  Nitrogen equivalent fertilizer, 
for example, averages 343 kg/ha and year for perennial crops as compared to 119 kg/ha for paddy 
and 125 kg/ha for upland crops.  However, urea plays an important part for all crop types, and the 
removal of urea protection is equivalent to a direct net transfer of income to irrigating farmers.   
Total irrigated area increases slightly between these two scenarios, from 1.546 million ha 
under BAU in 2010, with flexible area allocation to 1.548 million ha under TRDLIB, and 
TRDLIB helps move some of the unprofitable rice area back into the positive profit margin area.  
Moreover, under the TRDLIB scenario, the N-fertilizer application increases from an average of 
168 kg/ha for irrigated crops in the basin in BAU to 179 kg/ha, and the P-fertilizer application 





6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The paper introduced an economic-hydrologic river basin model and its application to the 
Dong Nai River Basin in southern Vietnam.  The model describes the water supply situation 
along the river system and the water demands by the various water-using sectors.  Water benefit 
functions are developed for productive water uses and minimum instream flows are included as 
constraints.  Water supply and demand are then balanced based on the economic objective of 
maximizing net benefits to water use.  This structure allows for intersectoral and multi-province 
analyses of water allocation and use with the objective to determine tradeoffs and 
complementarities in water usage and strategies for the efficient allocation of water resources.   
This type of model can help the provinces in the newly formed Dong Nai Planning 
Management Council to structure the complex reality of the Dong Nai water resources system.  
The model can be used both as a planning tool, focusing on the investment side, and even more 
so as a tool to develop strategies for basin management.  The model can support policymakers in 
their decision-making processes from an economic efficiency perspective.  Water allocation 
mechanisms need to be efficient, equitable, and environmentally sustainable. The model 
developed for the DNRB inherently ensures efficient water allocation in the basin as water is 
allocated according to its scarcity value to the highest valued uses and, once those are satisfied, to 
other uses, so long as the overall economic profit from water use across the basin increases. 
Finally, the model allows to analyze the impact of policies on outcomes for water and farm 
incomes at various levels: from changes in farmer behavior and decisions at the local/crop area 
level, to basin-level changes in water allocation mechanisms, up to national-level changes in 




Sensitivity analyses for changes in the overall irrigation efficiency have shown that water 
savings could be large.  However, the appropriate means to achieve these savings—either through 
structural/infrastructure measures, as chosen by the government, or through nonstructural 
measures, like improvement in management, or the implementation of a brokerage mechanism 
(see below)—warrant further analysis and discussion.  Only high levels of actual efficiency 
increase—for example, an increase in the combined conveyance and distribution efficiency to 
0.75—would actually lead to sufficient increased benefits through water savings to make the 
USD 52 million investment currently implemented a viable one.  However, other benefits, 
including cost savings due to reduced O&M from canal lining also would need to be considered.  
On the other hand, cessation of joint farmer canal cleaning can be a stumbling block for irrigation 
management transfer and farmer management of irrigation systems, and thus might not be 
conducive to the ongoing, albeit slow, process of decentralization in Vietnam’s irrigation sector.   
The simulation of alternative output prices received for pepper and coffee has 
demonstrated their large impact on the total basin economy over the last few years.  The 
reduction in coffee and pepper prices between 1998 and 2001 alone, has led to a decline in net 
farm incomes by USD 194 million in the DNRB (accompanied by a large drop in groundwater 
pumping of 218 MCM).  The drop in coffee and pepper prices is particularly worrisome, as these 
perennial crops are long-term investment decisions that cannot be changed in the matter of a 
season or even a year.  The multi-year reduction in coffee prices in Vietnam, in fact, has led to 
the destruction of several thousand hectares of coffee plants—albeit mostly older and less 
productive ones—and has led to the substitution of some area planted to the robusta variety with 
the more highly priced arabica variety.  However, coffee prices have since recovered to closer to 
1998 levels, returning the crop back to profitability.  The decline in pepper prices was not large 
enough to wipe out area.  Stabilizing and increasing farmgate prices through improved quality  
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and other measures must be a key goal for Vietnam’s agricultural policy, particularly for 
perennial crops, which cannot quickly adjust to the large price swings experienced in the basin in 
recent years.  
Results from the water use rights scenarios have shown that appropriate incentives can 
shift irrigated area allocation towards water savings while farmer incomes are maintained and 
urban and industrial water use shares increase.  Although not shown explicitly on the basis of 
alternative scenarios, the establishment of water use rights alone does provide security for all 
types of water users, as they guarantee a long-term right to access to a specific volume of water, 
which can lead to investments for improved water use in all sectors, and supports longer-term 
cropping decisions towards more high-value (and more risky) cropping patterns.  In particular, by 
making the limits to water use explicit, water use rights create incentives for the implementation 
of water-saving technologies to meet future demand.  The results from the alternative 
clearinghouse mechanism (BRK) scenarios have shown that farmers and other water users do 
respond positively to changes in the incentive structure for water allocation and use.  For 
example, water sales from irrigated areas occur more often, when rice constitutes a large share of 
the irrigated area in the specific demand site due to the lower value of water in rice irrigation 
compared to other cropping systems.  Moreover, in the case of the brokerage system, special 
attention has to be paid to the setting of the agency-fixed water price, at which users can sell part 
of their water use right or obtain access to additional water.  At relatively higher water purchase 
and sales prices, for example, at the USD 0.06/m
3 applied here, irrigators tend to sell a part of 
their water use right at the same time as profits from irrigated agriculture on a per hectare basis 
increase significantly, as water in low-value uses is sold first—here average profits per ha 
increased to USD 779/ha, and farmers earned an additional USD 89 million from water sales, but 
total profits from irrigated farming alone in the basin declined to USD 387 million.  The water  
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sold by irrigation sites translates into real water savings at the basin level that can enhance 
instream flows or can be used to meet urban-industrial demands.  If, on the other hand, the water 
purchase/sales price is relatively low, for example, at the USD 0.02/m
3 used here, then irrigation 
sites will tend to purchase additional water—here for USD 27 million—resulting in lower 
average profits per ha, here USD 538/ha, while total irrigation profits are higher, here at USD 486 
million.  In this case, instream flows decline, but irrigated area and farm employment increase.  
Thus, the brokerage systems can help achieve water savings in irrigated agriculture without 
hurting the net income situation in rural areas; in fact, farmer incomes are enhanced if appropriate 
incentives are provided.   
The brokerage mechanism has been examined here as it is relatively easier to implement 
in a developing-country context, once water use rights are established, as it requires no market 
clearing mechanism.  However, as the results here have shown as well, depending on the 
clearinghouse-set water price (and on the water scarcity or abundance situation), large volumes of 
additional water might be purchased, resulting in net incomes to the agency, but net losses to the 
environment and possibly to hydropower production, or large volumes of water use rights are 
sold to the agency, in which case the environment and hydropower benefit, at a net monetary cost 
to the agency.  The introduction of a market clearing mechanism avoids these possibly extreme—
albeit within physical, technical, system, and economic boundaries—sale and purchasing events 
by placing a limit on water use right sales, as bids to sell water are balanced with existing 
demands for additional water. 
Results for the series of MC scenarios have shown that although the volume of water sold 
and purchased is significantly reduced compared to the BRK scenarios—with maximum water 
volumes traded of 284 MCM under MC compared to 1,690 MCM under BRK—net gains across 
water-using sectors are as large or even larger compared to the BRK system.  However, the  
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implementation of an MC scenario in practice requires a complex information and management 
system, with large ensuing transaction costs, which would need to be estimated in detail prior to 
establishing such a system.   
The analyses have also shown that irrigation sites will only sell part of their water use 
rights, that is, the introduction of water trading does not necessarily lead to the cession of 
agricultural activities.  According to the model simulations, if water can be sold to or purchased 
from a clearinghouse, irrigators spend 5.6 percent of their farm incomes on purchasing additional 
water (to obtain 20 percent of their surface withdrawals) at the lower agency water price.  At the 
higher price, irrigators obtain 23 percent of their total irrigation profits from water sales, and sell 
33 percent of withdrawals (or 3 percent of total basin discharge).  If market clearing is 
introduced, 1.3 percent and 3.8 percent of the average farm income is obtained from water sales 
at the lower and higher water-trading price, respectively, and 5 percent of irrigation water is 
transferred out of agriculture.   
Finally, the application of both water-trading instruments are very flexible and can adapt 
to the changing scarcity value of water in the basin.  When water is abundant, for example, a low 
water price for sales and purchases can be set and most water will be used within its respective 
intended use.  As the basin economy develops and water becomes scarcer, the agency price could 
be increased to reflect the higher value of water in the basin, thus prompting additional water 
sales and investments in water-saving technologies in irrigated agriculture as well as other water-
use sectors.   
Moreover, the analysis of changes in macroeconomic policies—here the full removal of 
primary economic distortions (taxes, subsidies) that affect irrigated agricultural production (and 
hence agricultural water use)—compared to the current situation has shown that the prevailing 
pattern of price distortions has significant impacts on water usage at the basin (and national)  
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levels. The removal of remaining agricultural protection and subsidies would lead to direct annual 
farm income increases of USD 89 million in the Dong Nai River Basin (for the future 2010 
estimate). Thus, distorted input and output price policies also distort incentives for efficient land 
water allocation in irrigation and other water-using sectors. Efficient allocation of land and water 
resources at the basin level would be enhanced if policymakers remove remaining distortions at 
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